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EVIDENCE--ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-SURVIVAL OF THE PRIVILEGE
AFTER THE CLIENT'S DEATH-The United States Supreme Court held that the
federal evidentiary attorney-client privilege survives the client's death and
therefore protects an attorney's notes taken during a client meeting from dis-
covery by a federal grand jury when the client died shortly after the meeting and
the notes are sought because of their relevance to a criminal investigation con-
ducted by the Office of Independent Counsel.
Swidler &Berlinv. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
Vincent W. Foster, Jr., was Deputy White House Counsel in May of
1993 when the White House fired seven Travel Office employees.' The
firings created a wave of negative publicity for the White House and
sparked congressional and criminal investigations.2 In July of 1993, Mr.
Foster met with attorney James Hamilton from the law firm of Swidler &
Berlin3 to seek legal counsel regarding Mr. Foster's involvement in the
1. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2083 (1998). Mr. Foster, a lifelong
friend of President Clinton, was a partner in the Rose Law Firm of Little Rock, Arkansas, before
he assumed the duties of Deputy White House Counsel in January of 1993. See Hearings Relating
to Madison Guaranty S&L and the Whitewater Development Corporation-Washington, DC Phase:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 185
(1994) [hereinafter Madison Guaranty Hearings]. First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton was also a
partner at the Rose Law Firm. Id. The White House Travel Office coordinates the flight ar-
rangements for the members of the media who travel with the President on a regular basis. See
Ann Devroy and Ruth Marcus, Clinton Friend's Memo Sought Business; President's Cousin Pro-
posed Staffing Travel Office with Loyalists, WASH. POST, May 22, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Clinton
Friend's Memo]. "According to official White House statements, the employees were dismissed
after an audit ... uncovered 'gross management' and 'shoddy accounting practices.'" H.R. REP.
NO. 103-183, at 6. A former Clinton-Gore campaign worker was placed in charge of the Travel
Office on an interim basis. Id.
2. See, e.g., Clinton Friend's Memo, supra note 1 (implying that the Travel Office firings were
the result of cronyism); White House Follies: The Gang That Can't Fire Straight, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 1993, at 18 (reporting that the White House appeared "inept, callous and self-serving" due
to the firings); Sidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083 (explaining that the dispute between Swidler
& Berlin and the Office of Independent Counsel arose during a criminal investigation of activi-
ties that took place during a Congressional investigation of the Travel Office firings).
3. Attorney Hamilton, a 1963 Yale Law School graduate, practices in the areas of govern-
ment affairs litigation and criminal law. See MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY Vol. 4,
DC1005B to DC1006B (1998). Attorney Hamilton has written one book and several papers on
congressional investigations. Id. Swidler & Berlin is a Washington, D.C. law firm of more than
150 attorneys. Id. at DC1003B to DC1011B.
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Travel Office firings." Attorney Hamilton assured Mr. Foster that their
conversation was privileged and took three pages of handwritten notes
during a two-hour meeting.5 Nine days later, Mr. Foster committed sui-
cide.6 The Office of Independent Counsel ("OIC") subsequently began a
criminal investigation to determine whether various individuals ob-
structed justice during the congressional investigation of the Travel Of-
fice firings.' In December of 1995, the OIC attempted to discover attor-
ney Hamilton's handwritten notes through a federal grand jury
subpoena.' In a motion to quash the subpoena, Swidler & Berlin argued
4. Swidler &? Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. Mr. Foster was so distressed by the congressional
investigation of the Travel Office firings that he suffered an anxiety attack and considered re-
signing from his position as Deputy White House Counsel. See H.R. REP. No. 104-849, at 187-
89.
5. Swidler 6 Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. "We spoke alone for 2 hours, during which time I
took three pages of notes, which are the subject of this litigation here today. Before we began,
Mr. Foster asked me if the conversation was privileged and, without hesitation, I said that it
was." See United States Supreme Court Official Transcript of Oral Arguments, Swidler & Berlin
v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998) (No. 97.1192).
6. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. Mr. Foster was found dead from a gunshot wound
to the head in Fort Mercy Park, Virginia. See Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra note 1, at 182.
84. Independent investigations concluded that the cause of Mr. Foster's death was suicide, but
many observers continue to question Mr. Foster's motivation for committing suicide. See Madi-
son Guaranty Hearings, supra note 1, at 182-379 (discussing speculations of murder but con-
cluding that the cause of Mr. Foster's death was suicide); Reed Irvine and Joe Goulden, Unre-
mitting Trail of Clues in the Foster Suicide, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at D3 (discussing evi-
dence that Mr. Foster's suicide was motivated by his "close relationship with the Clintons" and
his concern for their future). A torn up note, found in Mr. Foster's briefcase and believed to be
a draft of his opening argument in an imagined Congressional hearing, read, in part, "[n]o one in
the White House, to my knowledge, violated any law or standard of conduct, including any
action in the travel office. There was no intent to benefit any individual or specific group." See
Madison Guaranty Hearings, supra note 1, at 189.
7. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. A special division of the judiciary appoints the
Independent Counsel, who has the responsibility of investigating possible criminal misconduct
by high-level government officials. See the Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-5
99 (1998). Individuals investigated included William Kennedy, Associate Counsel to the Presi-
dent, who was told by Mr. Foster to handle the intial audit of the Travel Office. See Madison
Guaranty Hearings, supra note 1, at 187.
8. Swidler &? Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. A grand jury is generally defined as a "jury of in-
quiry ... whose duty is to receive complaints and accusations in criminal cases, hear the evi-
dence adduced on the part of the state, and find bills of indictment in cases where they are
satisfied a trial ought to be had." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855 (6th ed. 1990). "This is
called a 'grand jury' because it comprises a greater number of jurors than the ordinary trial jury
or 'petit jury."' Id. A federal grand jury consists of "not less than sixteen nor more than twenty-
three persons." Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3321 (1998); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. A subpoena is "a com-
mand to appear at a certain time and place to give testimony upon a certain matter." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990). The subpoena referred to in this case was actually a
subpoena duces tecum, which is "[a] court process ... compelling production of certain specific
documents and other items, material and relevant to facts in issue in a pending judicial pro-
ceeding, which documents and items are in custody and control of person or body served with
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that the attorney-client privilege and the work product privilege pro-
tected the notes from discovery.9
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ex-
amined the notes in camera" and determined that both privilege doc-
trines protected attorney Hamilton's handwritten notes from discovery."
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed because it
found that posthumous breaches of the attorney-client privilege in a
criminal context would not have a significant chilling effect on a client's
communications with an attorney.' 2 The court created a case-by-case
balancing test for posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege
in criminal matters. 3 Under this balancing test, the trial judge would
weigh the extent of the prosecutor's need for privileged documents
against the apparent extent of the deceased client's concern for civil li-
ability or reputational damage.' 4 The court of appeals determined that a
narrow exception for use only in the "discrete realm"'5 of those criminal
process." Id. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.
9. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. Attorney-client privilege is a "client's privilege to
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
between [the client] and [the client's] attorney." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed.
1990). "Such privilege protects communications between attorney and client made for purpose
of furnishing or obtaining professional legal advice or assistance." Id. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
Under the work product privilege, "any notes, working papers, memoranda or similar materials,
prepared by an attorney in anticipation of litigation, are protected from discovery." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1606 (6th ed. 1990). See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3).
10. In camera means "[iun chambers." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 760 (6th ed. 1990). "A
judicial proceeding is said to be heard in camera either when the hearing is had before the judge
in his private chambers or when all spectators are excluded from the courtroom." Id.
11. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083.
12. In re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230, 232-33 (D.C. Cir. 1997), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998).
The circuit court would have remanded the case to the trial judge to redact the portions of
attorney Hamilton's notes that reflected the attorney's "mental impressions," thus complying
with the work product privilege. Id. at 236-37. This case was before Judges Wald, Williams, and
Tatel. Id. at 231. Judge Williams wrote the opinion for the court, in which Judge Wald joined.
Id. Judge Tatel wrote a dissenting opinion. Id.
13. Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233-35.
14. Id. at 233-34. The court's rather imprecise wording of this balancing test is as follows:
[lit is surely true that the risk of post-death revelation will typically trouble the
client less than pre-death revelation. The question is how much less, and the
answer seems likely to depend on the context. On one side, criminal liability
will have ceased altogether. Civil liability, on the other hand, characteristically
continues .... In the middle are reputational concerns. . . . The costs of pro-
tecting communications after death are high. Obviously the death removes the
client as a direct source of information .... Thus the fewer, and the more ques-
tionable the remaining sources (e.g., because of witnesses' interest or bias), the
greater the relative value of what the deceased has told his lawyer.
Id. The court of appeals clarified that attorney Hamilton's notes would certainly be protected by
the attorney-client privilege if Mr. Foster were still alive. Id. at 231.
15. Id. at 234.
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proceedings that involve the privileged communications of dead clients
would not chill a client's disclosures to an attorney.
1 6
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 7 to de-
termine whether the attorney-client privilege, as established under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, protects an attorney's notes made during an
initial interview with a client when the client subsequently dies and the
notes are relevant to a criminal proceeding." Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote the majority opinion, which reversed the circuit court decision.' 9
The Court began its analysis by recognizing that the purpose of an
attorney-client privilege is to promote the broad public policy of the ad-
ministration of justice by encouraging "full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients."' Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that
common law principles and "the light of reason and experience" must
guide the Court's interpretation of the scope of the attorney-client privi-
lege.
2'
16. Id. "[We think that [witness] unavailability through death, coupled with the non-
existence of any client concern for criminal liability after death, creates a discrete realm (use in
criminal proceedings after death of the client) where the privilege should not automatically
apply." Id. "We reject a general balancing test in all but this narrow circumstance." Id. "The
Court of Appeals also held that the notes were not protected by the work product privilege."
Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2084. In the dissenting opinion at the circuit court level, Judge
Tatel expressed a practical concern about the court's decision in the following hypothetical
caveat that he envisioned an attorney making before a client conference:
I cannot represent you effectively unless I know everything. I will hold all our
conversations in the strictest of confidence. But when you die, I could be forced
to testify--against your interests-in a criminal investigation or trial, even of
your friends or family, if the court decides that what you tell me is important to
the prosecution. Now, please tell me the whole story.
Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 239 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel feared that clients would not
disclose sensitive information following such a caveat, because neither the client nor the attor-
ney would be able to predict whether particular discussions are protected. Id.
17. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1358 (1998). Certiorari is defined as a
"writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an inferior court requiring the latter to pro-
duce a certified record of a particular case tried therein." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 228 (6th
ed. 1990). The United States Supreme Court "uses the writ of certiorari as a discretionary de-
vice to choose the cases it wishes to hear." Id.
18. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083.
19. Id. The Court decided that the attorney-client privilege protected attorney Hamilton's
notes from discovery; therefore, it did not reach the question of work product privilege. Id. at
2084 n. 1. Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist in the majority opinion; Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Justice O'Connor in her
dissenting opinion. Id. at 2083.
20. Id. at 2084 (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
21. Id. Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides a general rule regarding the
existence and scope of privileges. "Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress.. . the privilege of a witness.., shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501.
Swidler & Berlin v. United States
The Court found a vast body of case law and commentary support-
ing Swidler & Berlin's position that the attorney-client privilege survived
the death of Mr. Foster.2 2 In contrast, only one state appellate court ex-
pressly allowed a breach of the attorney-client privilege following the cli-
ent's death, by balancing the interest of justice in seeking truth and the
interest of the client in preserving confidentiality. 23 The OIC had the
burden of proving that "reason and experience" justified a breach of the
attorney-client privilege under the facts of Swidler & Berlin, despite the
lack of common law authority.'
The majority opinion next discussed the testamentary exception to
the attorney-client privilege, which permits disclosure of privileged com-
munications following a testator's death if the communications are rele-
vant to litigation between the testator's heirs.' The OIC analogized the
posthumous termination of the attorney-client privilege in criminal pro-
ceedings to this testamentary exception.26 Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
jected this argument because the rationale for the testamentary excep-
tion in will disputes is based on furthering the client's intent, but testi-
mony in criminal proceedings about privileged documents does not simi.
larly further the client's intent.27
The OIC also argued that the proposed narrow exception would
have minimal impact on the quality of client communications with at-
torneys, partly because the mere existence of other exceptions shows that
the attorney-client privilege is not absolute. 2 For several reasons, the
Court did not agree.29 First, attorneys cannot explain the scope of confi-
22. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2084-86.
23. Id. at 2084. The Court noted that even the one case supporting the OIC's position
"recognized that the privilege generally survives death, but concluded that it could make an
exception where the interest of justice was compelling and the interest of the client in preserv-
ing the confidence was insignificant." Id. See Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689,
692-93 (Pa. Super. 1976).
24. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2086.
28. Id. at 2087. Specifically, the OIC listed the testamentary exception and the crime-fraud
exception. Id. Under the crime-fraud exception, the attorney-client privilege does not protect
any communications between an attorney and a client that are made for the purpose of further-
ing criminal or fraudulent activity. See Developments in the Law--Privileged Communications, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1509-10 (1985) [hereinafter Privileged Communications]. However, "con-
sultations with an attorney after a crime or fraud has taken place remain privileged." Id. at
1510.
29. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087-88. "The established exceptions are consistent with
the purposes of the privilege ... while a posthumous exception in criminal cases appears at odds
with the goals of encouraging full and frank communication and of protecting the client's inter-
ests." Id. at 2087. See Glover v. Patten, 165 U.S. 394, 407-08 (1897) (explaining that the tes-
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dentiality to clients under the proposed exception when the attorney
cannot foresee the relevance of the discussion to criminal matters.3 ° Sec-
ond, the accumulation of exceptions contributes to the erosion of the
attorney-client privilege without the necessary guidance from either
common law principles or from "reason and experience. ''3' The Court
concluded that the OIC did not make a sufficient showing that "reason
and experience" require overruling the prevailing common law principle
that the attorney-client privilege survived Mr. Foster's death.32 The OIC
was not permitted to see attorney Hamilton's handwritten notes.33
In a dissenting opinion, justice O'Connor focused on the following
two consequences of a client's death: (1) a diminished risk that disclosure
of privileged information will harm the client; and (2) a heightened ur-
gency for disclosure of privileged information when relevant to criminal
proceedings. 34 Justice O'Connor was concerned that posthumous appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege may undermine the truth-seeking
function of a criminal court by excluding relevant evidence from the fact
finder.35 The dissenting opinion relies on four authorities that the major-
ity found unpersuasive for the proposition that a court's need for relevant
evidence after the client's death may trump the client's need for confi-
dentiality.36
tamentary exception is consistent with protecting a client's interests); United States v. Zolin,
491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (explaining that the crime-fraud exception is consistent with encour-
aging open communication of past events).
30. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2088.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
35. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "Extreme injustice may
occur, for example, where a criminal defendant seeks disclosure of a deceased client's confession
to the offense .... [T]he paramount value that our criminal justice system places on protecting
an innocent defendant should outweigh a deceased client's interest in preserving confidences."
Id. See State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976) (holding that an attorney's testi-
mony regarding a now-deceased client's admission to a murder, although tending to exculpate
the criminal defendant, is inadmissible).
36. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). These sources were as
follows: (1) the California Evidence Code, (2) the Pennsylvania case of Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab
Co., (3) the proposed Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawryers, and (4) a treatise on
federal evidence by C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick. Id. The California Evidence Code terminates
the attorney-client privilege when the dead client's estate has been wound up, because "there is
little reason to preserve secrecy at the expense of excluding relevant evidence after the estate is
wound up and the representative is discharged." See CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 954, comments.
The Pennsylvania case of Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co. was the sole appellate opinion
(other than the D.C. circuit court's opinion in Swidler & Berlin) to allow a posthumous breach of
the attorney-client privilege outside of the traditional exceptions. See Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab
Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 1976). The proposed Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Vol. 37:385
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In addition, the dissenters did not agree with the majority that the
prevailing case law clearly stands for the principle that the attorney-client
privilege remains absolute after the client's death.37 The majority opinion
acknowledged that the opinions constituting the prevailing case law "pre-
sume the privilege survives" without expressly holding that it does so.38
Justice O'Connor did not propose that the attorney-client privilege
automatically cease at the client's death.39 Rather, she proposed an ex-
ception with three conditions precedent: (1) an assertion of the privilege
in a criminal case; (2) a showing that the information involved contains
"necessary factual information;" and (3) a showing that this factual in.
formation is not "otherwise available."' If these three elements were met,
the trial judge would then weigh the harm of precluding critical evidence
against the historically recognized benefit of absolute client confidential-
ity.
4 1
The client's privilege to keep his or her communications with an
attorney confidential is ancient and fundamental.42 Two distinct legal
concepts are involved in a discussion of this confidentiality; these are the
court's evidentiary rules concerning communications from client to at-
torney and the attorney's ethical duty to keep client information confi-
dential.43 The ethical duty is typically expressed in the form of rules for
Lawyers advises that courts weigh the client's interest in confidentiality against the nature of the
litigant's need for the communication on a case-by-case basis to determine if the attorney-client
privilege should be breached. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
127 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996). However, the Restatement recognizes that "no
court or legislature has adopted [such a balancing test]." Id. Mueller & Kirkpatrick's treatise on
federal evidence suggests that in the case of "a deceased client [who] has confessed to criminal
acts that are later charged to another, surely the latter's need for evidence sometimes outweighs
the interest in preserving the confidences." 2 C. MUELLER & L. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 199 (2nd ed. 1994).
37. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2085. The dissenters rebut, "opinions squarely addressing the posthumous force of
the privilege 'are relatively rare.'" Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2088-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2090 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This exception, complete with the balancing test,
is more clearly articulated than is the circuit court's holding below but in essence is the same.
See supra note 14 for the exact language of the circuit court's test; Sealed Case, 124 F.3d at 233-
34.
42. 8 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2290-2291 (McNaugh-
ton rev. ed. 1961). Other relationships that give rise to privileged information are physician-
patient, clergy-communicant, husband-wife, parent-child, and relationships in various institu-
tional settings such as journalism and academic research. See Privileged Communications, supra
note 28 (analyzing the history, scope, and justification of the major evidentiary privileges in
American law).
43. See Brian R. Hood, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6: Permitting
Limited Disclosure After the Death of the Client, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741, 745-46 (1994)
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professional conduct and, therefore, is not a factor in judicial opinions."
The evidentiary privilege is typically expressed in a combination of rules
of evidence 45 and common law.' In the 1950 case of United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp.,'7 Judge Wyzanski offered the following
statute-like definition of the evidentiary attorney-client privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought
to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made (a)
is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with
this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the pres-
ence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not
(d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
48
Legal scholars have traced the evidentiary attorney-client privilege
to Roman civil law, and it was firmly established in England by the mid-
sixteenth century.49 The rationale for the creation of such a privilege was
attorney oriented; the attorney's code of honor did not allow the attorney
to disclose the client's secrets.5" Today, the rationales often expressed for
the attorney-client privilege are client oriented; our adversarial system of
justice functions more effectively if clients are assured that their attorneys
will not reveal their secrets,5" and the client's right to privacy outweighs
(discussing the historically distinct yet practically intertwined evidentiary privilege and ethical
duty).
44. See Hood, supra note 43, at 746 (arguing that "ethical duties should not, in theory, pro-
vide a basis for judicial decision making"). The American Bar Association's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from "reveal[ing] information relating to representa-
tion of a client unless the client consents after consultation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995).
45. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that "the privilege of a witness... shall be governed
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience").
46. See Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1458-63, 1470-71 (tracing the develop-
ment of state and federal evidentiary privileges through judge-made law).
47. 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
48. United Shoe Machiney Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 358-59. Shepardizing this popular passage
reveals that it has been cited with approval in at least 79 published opinions of federal district
and circuit courts.
49. See James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VIL. L. REV.
279, 288-90 (1963) (explaining the influence of Roman law and the existence of the attorney-
client privilege during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I).
50. See WIGMORE, supra note 42, at § 2290.
51. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (explaining that the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is "to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
1999 Swidler & Berlin v. United States
society's need for total historical truth.52 The practical effect of the evi-
dentiary privilege is to provide an exception to the common law testimo-
nial rule, which requires any person with information relevant to a legal
proceeding to testify when called by the court. 3
The Supreme Court of the United States first expressly recognized
the existence of an evidentiary attorney-client privilege in the 1826 case
of Chirac v. Reinicker.54 In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court not only
affirmed the privilege's existence, it characterized the privilege as "indis-
pensable for the purposes of private justice."55 The issue before the Court
was whether merely identifying an individual as a client of a particular
attorney violated the attorney-client privilege. 6 In resolving this issue,
Justice Story indicated in dictum that an attorney can never disclose facts
related by a client to the attorney.5 Justice Story concluded that merely
establishing an individual as the client of a particular attorney does not
violate the attorney-client privilege, but the attorney cannot testify as to
the specific claim about which the client was counseled."
and administration of justice").
52. See, e.g., Hood, supra note 43, at 760-61 (listing the client's right to privacy and need for
dignity as justifications for an attorney-client privilege).
53. See WIGMORE, supra note 42, at § 2192.
54. 24 U.S. 280 (1826).
55. Chirac, 24 U.S. at 294.
56. Id. at 293-94. The facts giving rise to this issue involved two separate lawsuits; the first
was an ejectment action brought by the heirs of J.B. Chirac to recover possession of property
from its apparent landlord, C.J. Chirac. Id. at 280-83. The plaintiffs won possession and then
brought a second lawsuit for money damages. Id. at 280. In the second lawsuit, George Re-
inicker claimed to be the true landlord of the property. Id. at 292. Reinicker argued that he had
not been proven a trespasser because he was not a party to the first suit; therefore, he could not
be held liable for money damages. Id. at 290-94. The plaintiffs in the second suit rebutted
Reinicker's argument by calling as witnesses the defense attorneys from the first suit and asking
whether the defense of the first suit had in fact been orchestrated and paid for by Reinicker but
using C.J. Chirac as the named party. Id. at 294. Counsel for defendant Reinicker in the second
suit objected to the question as breaching the attorney-client privilege, and the trial judge sus-
tained the objection. Id. The plaintiffs then lost the money damages suit and appealed, among
other things, the trial judge's ruling that the attorney-client privilege prevents an attorney from
testifying as to the particular claim about which a client was counseled. Id. at 293-303. Justice
Story affirmed the trial judge's ruling on the privilege issue, but the plaintiffs won a new trial on
other grounds. Id. at 303.
57. Id. at 294. "The general rule is not disputed, that confidential communications between
client and' attorney, are not to be revealed at any time.... Whatever facts, therefore, are com-
municated by a client to counsel, soley on account of that relation, such counsel are not at
liberty, even if they wish, to disclose; and the law holds their testimony incompetent." Id.
58. Id. at 294-95. Most federal courts still follow the rule that, absent special circumstances,
a client's identity is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. See, e.g., Clarke. v. American
Commerce Nat'l Bank, 974 F.2d 127, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Levanthal, 961
F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Goldberger & Dubin, P.C., 935 F.2d 501, 505
(2d Cir. 1991).
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In 1888, the Supreme Court decided Hunt v. Blackburns9 and clari-
fied that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client alone.'
Therefore, if the client waives the privilege, the attorney is free to speak
about otherwise-confidential matters.6' The Court held that when a cli-
ent raises a defense based on the attorney's legal advice, the client waives
the attorney-client privilege and loses the right to prevent the attorney's
testimony to otherwise-confidential matters.62
In the 1897 case of Glover v. Patten,63 the Supreme Court retreated
slightly from Justice Story's bold statement in Chirac that a client's com-
munications "are not to be revealed at any time" by the client's
attorney. 64 In Glover, the five daughters of Anastasia Patten disputed
their respective amounts of inheritance under their mother's will.
65
When Anastasia's husband, Edmund, died in 1872, Anastasia inherited
one half of his estate and their five minor daughters (Mary, Augusta, Jo-
sephine, Edith, and Helen) inherited the other half.66 Anastasia took
possession of the entire estate and kept no records concerning expenses
incurred for her daughters' benefit.67 Thirteen years after Edmund's
death, Anastasia consulted attorney Curtis Hillyer to prepare a document
liquidating the amount owed to each daughter at $101,600.68 Daughter
Augusta received her liquidated payment the night that she married John
Glover.69 The other four daughters subsequently received a payment of
$11,250 each, after which Anastasia died.7"
The daughters discovered that Anastasia had prepared a will after
Edmund's death and before the liquidated payments agreement was pre-
59. 128 U.S. 464 (1888).
60. Hunt, 128 U.S. at 470.
61. Id. The dispute in this case involved an attorney named Weatherford and a rather com-
plicated land transaction, in which Weatherford acquired and sold a piece of land that Weath-
erford's former client, Blackburn, later made claim to. Id. at 465-67. Blackburn claimed that
Weatherford gave bad legal advice concerning Blackburn's chances of winning a dispute with a
subsequent good-faith purchaser. Id. at 467. When Weatherford attempted to testify as to the
basis for his advice to Blackburn, Blackburn objected that such information was privileged. Id.
at 470. The trial judge, in a decision that was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, ruled that
Blackburn had waived the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 470-71.
62. Id. at 470-71.
63. 165 U.S. 394 (1897).
64. Chirac, 24 U.S. at 294.
65. Glover, 165 U.S. at 395.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 395-96.
69. Id. at 397.
70. Glover, 165 U.S. at 397.
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pared.7' This will devised Anastasia's estate equally to the five
daughters.72 Daughter Augusta, now with the surname of Glover,
claimed that the will extinguished Anastasia's debt to all five daughters
under Edmund's will, rendering the liquidated payments agreement
meaningless.73 Under this interpretation, Anastasia's remaining estate
would be divided equally among the five daughters, and Mary, Josephine,
Edith, and Helen would not be paid the balance they were due under the
liquidated payments agreement.74 Augusta's sisters took exception with
this argument; in the subsequent litigation, they asked attorney Hillyer to
testify regarding their mother's intent in preparing both the will and the
liquidated payments agreement.7" Augusta argued that the attorney-
client privilege prevented attorney Hillyer from testifying as to
Anastasia's intent.7" The lower court permitted attorney Hillyer to testify,
and Augusta appealed.77
In an opinion written by Justice Brown, the Supreme Court affirmed
and recognized for the first time a testamentary exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege.7" Justice Brown relied on English common law in
concluding that a devisee's statements to an attorney regarding the exe-
cution of a will or similar document are not protected by the attorney-
client privilege in a subsequent dispute between the heirs or next of kin.79
The Court's rationale depended on a concept of implied waiver of the
privilege by the client under such circumstances."0 A rationale based on
waiver of the privilege after the client's death necessarily implies that the
privilege survives the client's death."
In Glover, Justice Brown notes that several state courts had already
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 398-99.
74. Id. at 398-99, 410.
75. Glover, 165 U.S. at 400, 406.
76. Id. at 406.
77. Id. at 400-01.
78. Id. at 406-08.
79. Id. at 400, 406-08, 413. Justice Brown clarified that the testamentary exception may not
apply if the claims against the estate are brought by "third persons" as opposed to heirs. Id. at
406. In one of the English cases relied on by the court, Vice Chancellor Turner wrote "That the
privilege does not in all cases terminate with the death of the party, I entertain no doubt." Id. at
407, quoting Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare. 387, 68 Eng.Rep. 558 (V.C. 1851). This seems to indi-
cate that, in at least some cases, the privilege does terminate with the death of the client.
80. Glover, 165 U.S. at 408. Justice Brown cited Hunt v. Blackburn as authority for the
waiver concept. Id; see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text for discussion of Hunt.
81. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085. See John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d
69 (Mass. 1990) (explaining that "[ilf the privilege were to end upon the death of the client,
there would be nothing for the executor or administrator to waive").
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recognized the testamentary rule as an exception to state evidentiary
rules regarding the attorney-client privilege. 2 Federal courts have always
been interested in the status of state court privilege rules.8 3 Before Con-
gress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1973, federal courts fre-
quently applied state evidentiary statutes to privilege matters in civil
cases." The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required federal
courts to consider state court evidentiary rules when reviewing issues
concerning the admissibility of evidence.8 5 Similarly, the 1946 Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure required federal courts to determine privi-
lege matters "by the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and expe-
rience. 8 6 Thus, until the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in
1973, federal courts applied state evidentiary rules for civil cases and at-
tempted to develop a body of federal common law to resolve evidentiary
issues in criminal cases.87
In the century between the 1897 Glover decision, in which the
United States Supreme Court first recognized the testamentary excep-
tion, and the 1998 Swidler & Berlin decision, many state supreme courts
and commentators recognized a general rule under which the attorney-
client privilege survived the client's death.8 The vast majority of these
state court decisions involved the testamentary exception, which by its
82. Glover, 165 U.S. at 408. The four states were Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri, and Con-
necticut. Id.
83. See Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1463.
84. Id.
85. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (1938) (amended 1975), which stated, in part, that "[all
evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under
the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United States[,] . . . or under the
rules of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United
States court is held."
86. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (1945) (amended 1975). This rule codified the holding of Wolfle v.
United States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). See Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 12; PTivileged Communications, supra
note 28, at 1464.
87. Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1464-65.
88. See, e.g., Morris v. Cain, 1 So. 797 (La. 1887)-; Peyton v. Werhane, 11 A.2d 800 (Conn.
1940); Martin v. Shaen, 156 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1945); Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
R.R. Co., 179 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1970); State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976); Mehus
v. Thompson, 266 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1978); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 1981); In re
John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990); People v. Modzelewski, 203
A.D.2d 594 (N.Y. 1994); Mayberry v. Indiana, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. 1996). See generally
CHARLES MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 94 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed.
1992) (stating that "[t]he accepted theory is that the protection afforded by the privilege will in
general survive the death of the client"); WIGMORE, supra note 42, at § 2323 (summarizing that
"the privilege continues even after the end of the litigation ... and even after the death of the
client") (emphasis in original).
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very existence implies the survival of the privilege.89 The often-expressed
rationale for the testamentary exception was a waiver theory; the dece-
dent's representative can waive the privilege if necessary to learn the de-
cedent's testamentary intent, especially if waiving the privilege will not
adversely effect the decedent's reputation.'
An example of a decision involving posthumous application of the
attorney-client privilege but not involving the testamentary exception is
the 1970 Iowa case of Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad
Co.91 In this case, the defendant's train collided with a car driven by Bai-
ley's wife, killing her instantly.' Bailey brought a wrongful death action
in Iowa state court against the railroad, claiming that the railroad caused
his wife's death.93 Bailey then filed a pretrial motion in limine,94 request-
ing the trial court to rule that any evidence related to the fact that his
wife had filed for divorce one year before the accident be inadmissible.9"
The trial court granted Bailey's motion."
At the trial, the defendant railroad called as a witness attorney Ward
Reynoldson, who had counseled Bailey's wife regarding her divorce ac-
tion.97 Over Bailey's privilege objection, the trial judge allowed attorney
Reynoldson to divulge the confidential communications made by Bailey's
wife during her divorce consultations.9" The jury found for the defendant
railroad, and the plaintiff appealed." In addition to two procedural issues
before the Iowa Supreme Court was the third question of whether the
attorney-client privilege prevented attorney Reynoldson from testifying as
89. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
90. See, e.g., Martin v. Shaen, 156 P.2d 681, 684 (Wash. 1945) (outlining the general rule
that the personal representative of the deceased client may waive the attorney-client privilege in
a will dispute only if such waiver would not adversely effect the deceased client's reputation).
91. 179 N.W.2d 560 (Iowa 1970).
92. Bailey, 179 N.W.2d at 561.
93. Id.
94. A motion in limine is "a pretrial motion requesting court to prohibit opposing counsel
from referring to or offering evidence on matters so highly prejudicial to moving party that cura-
tive instructions cannot prevent predispositional effect on jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1013 (6th ed. 1990). "Purpose of such motion is to avoid injection into trial of matters which
are irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial...." Id.
95. Bailey, 179 N.W.2d at 561-62. Bailey's wife was divorcing him, in part, because "the
hired man's wife had five children, the father of the last two being [Bailey]." Id. at 563. Pre-
sumably Bailey thought it bad trial strategy when suing the railroad for damages resulting from
his wife's death to allow the jury to learn of his marital infidelity, illegitimate children, and
pending divorce.
96. Id. at 562.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 561.
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to Bailey's wife's communications regarding her divorce action. 10
The Iowa Supreme Court expressly ruled that the attorney-client
privilege, unless waived by the client, lives forever."0' According to the
Bailey Court, this rule applies regardless of any change in the attorney-
client relationship, including the client's death."0 2 The court held that
the trial judge erred in overruling Bailey's objections to attorney Reynold-
son's testimony and remanded the case for a new trial.'03 The court's ra-
tionale was that disclosure by the attorney of privileged information re-
garding a deceased client could still harm the client or the client's
estate."° The court also made a rare reference to the American Bar As-
sociation ("ABA") Code of Responsibility and the corresponding ethical
duty of confidentiality.0" The rule cited by the Bailey Court was from the
1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandated
that "a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a confidence or secret of his
client"'' and clarified that this obligation "continues after the termina-
tion of [the lawyer's] employment.'
0 7
The 1969 ABA Model Code was superseded by the 1983 ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.0 8 Rule 1.6 of the 1983 Model
Rules governs client confidentiality"° and is generally regarded as allow-
ing even less disclosure than did its 1969 counterpart."0 Today, the ABA
100. Bailey, 179 N.W.2d at 562. One of the two procedural questions on appeal involved the
plaintiff's claim that the trial judge failed to rule on the plaintiff's "application for adjudication
of law points." Id. The second procedural question on appeal involved the plaintiffs claim that
the trial judge failed to fully rule on the plaintiff's pretrial motion in limine regarding the.exclu-
sion of evidence of the pending divorce action. Id. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the
application for adjudication of law points claim had no merit but that the motion in limine claim
had some merit and was to be considered by the trial judge on remand. Id. at 562-63.
101. Id. at 564.
102. Id. (quoting 8 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2323
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)).
103. Id. at 565.
104. Id. at 564.
105. Bailey, 179 N.W.2d at 565. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-
101 notes (1969). The American Bar Association has produced rules of professional ethics for
attorneys since 1908. See Hood, supra note 43, at 750; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS (1908).
106. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (B) (1969). An attorney
who failed to meet Rule 4-101 (B) was subject to disciplinary action. See Hood, supra note 43, at
754 n.64; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1969).
107. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1969).
108. Hood, supra note 43, at 752.
109. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983). This rule prohibits an
attorney from "reveal[ing] information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation." Id.
110. Hood, supra note 43, at 753-54.
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Model Rules impose a very broad and deep duty on attorneys to protect
their clients' confidentiality.
Shortly after the ABA updated the 1908 Canons with the 1969
Model Code, the Supreme Court (prompted by the ABA) promulgated
the Federal Rules of Evidence."' The 1972 proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence expressly recognized, among eight other privileges, the attor-
ney-client privilege." 2 These controversial privilege rules in the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence called for an end to both federal common law
development of privileges and federal court application of state eviden-
tiary rules.'
1 3
Because of sharp criticism of the express privileges in the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, Congress deleted them and substituted a rule
very similar to the stance taken in the 1946 Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.'14 Under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal
courts are to determine the scope of a witness's privilege according to
"the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience."
' 15
Therefore, Rule 501 allows the federal courts to develop a body of federal
common law regarding privileges. 1 6 Federal courts rely on state privilege
rules as persuasive precedent and are required to apply the state rule in
most diversity jurisdiction cases. 7 In cases such as Swidler & Berlin, the
Supreme Court determines the prevailing view under state common law
before creating new federal common law for evidentiary matters.1
The majority opinion in Swidler & Berlin found that the prevailing
view under state common law supported absolute nondisclosure by attor-
ney Hamilton. 9 The Court found only one state appellate court decision
supporting the OIC's argument for breaching the attorney-client privilege
after the client has died in circumstances other than the traditional ex-
111. See Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1465.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1465-66; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text.
114. Id. at 1469; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
115. FED. R. EVID. 501.
116. See Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1470-71; Trammel v. United States, 445
U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (explaining that Rule 501 permits courts to develop privilege law on a "case-
by-case basis").
117. See Privileged Communications, supra note 28, at 1470. Rule 501 states that "in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness... shall be determined in accordance with
State law." FED. R. EVID. 501.
118. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084-85 (1998).
119. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2084-85.
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ceptions. ' That case is Cohen v. Jenkinown Cab Co., a 1976 opinion
from Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court.' In Cohen, a pedes-
trian (Claire Cohen) was struck by a cab driven by an employee of Jen-
kintown Cab Company (Edward Guise)." Guise lied to the police (and
to Cohen) concerning his involvement, claiming to have merely wit-
nessed the accident.' The Cohens collected $30,00 from their insur-
ance company because Guise repeated his lie at an insurance arbitration
hearing.'
24
Subsequently, Cohen's attorney began to suspect that Guise was, in
fact, the driver who had struck Cohen and not a mere witness. 125 The
Cohens contemplated a civil suit against Jenkintown Cab Company and
deposed Guise's attorney, Charles Gross." At the deposition, attorney
Gross stated that Guise "admitted to having been the driver of the car
[that] struck Mrs. Cohen."' The Cohens sued Jenkintown Cab Com-
pany, and when the Cohens sought to admit evidence of the confidential
communication from Guise to attorney Gross, both the cab company and
Guise's widow objected on the grounds that the admission was protected
by the attomey-client privilege."~ The trial judge sustained the defen-
dant's objection, and with very little other evidence to support the plain
tiffs claim, the jury found for Jenkintown Cab Company. 9
The issue on appeal was whether the jury was entitled to learn about
the confidential admission by Guise to attorney Gross when the Cohens
had no other evidence with which to establish their case, Guise was de-
ceased and therefore not subject to criminal actions, and Guise had no
estate to be joined as a third-party defendant to the civil suit.' The ap-
120. Id. at 2084.
121. Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689 (Pa. Super. 1976).
122. Cohen, 357 A.2d at 690-91. Cohen was seriously injured by the accident and had little
or no recollection of the circumstances surrounding the accident. Id. at 690, 693. There were
no eyewitnesses. Id. at 693.
123. Id. at 690-91. Guise told the police that "a dark-colored, hit-and-run vehicle" had
struck Cohen. Id. at 690. Guise was responsible for two previous accidents while employed by
Jenkintown and had been warned that a third accident would end his career as a cab driver. Id.
at 693 n.3.
124. Id. at 690.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 690-91.
127. Cohen, 357 A.2d at 690-91. Guise made this admission to attorney Gross during a con-
sultation prior to the arbitration hearing. 1d. at 691. Attorney Gross advised Guise to either tell
the truth or take the Fifth Amendment at the arbitration hearing. Id.
128. Id. at 691. Apparently Guise died at some point between the insurance arbitration
hearing and the trial; therefore, his widow asserted the privilege on his behalf.
129. Id. at 691, 693.
130. Id. at 691-94.
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pellate court held that the only modem purpose for an attorney-client
privilege is "to aid in the administration of justice" and that under these
facts the privilege was frustrating the administration of justice.' 3' The
court also cautioned trial judges who might exercise this rule in the fu-
ture to "resolve all doubt in favor of non-disclosure, so that a client
should not be chagrined to learn that the confidences that he conveyed
to his attorney have been revealed to his detriment and without his con-
sent."'
132
A scenario discussed by commentators in which the administration
of justice is clearly and tragically frustrated by the existence of the attor-
ney-client privilege involves an attorney who knows that a convicted
criminal defendant is innocent. 3 If this knowledge is based on confiden-
tial client communications to the attorney, then the attorney-client
privilege bars the attorney from exonerating the innocent person, even if
the client died after making the admission.1" This was precisely the con-
cern of the dissenting Justice O'Connor in Swidler & Berlin, 3 and it was
precisely the facts before the Arizona Supreme Court in the 1976 case of
Stare v. Macumber'
136
In 1974, William Macumber's estranged wife reported to the police
that her husband had recently admitted to committing a twelve-year-old
double murder that until then had stumped the police.' Macumber ad-
mitted to the police "that he had told his wife that he had killed the two
victims.' 31 a Macumber was accused and convicted of two counts of first-
degree murder. 3 9 At his trial, Macumber produced as witnesses two at-
131. Id. at 693-94. It was also important to the court that the disclosure of Guise's admission
was unlikely to harm Guise's interests or reputation. Id. at 693.
132. Cohen, 357 A.2d at 694. The court did not explain how a dead client would learn that
an attorney had disclosed confidential information.
133. See Hood, supra note 43, at 741-42. Hood begins his article on Rule 1.6 of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct with a fictional account of a troubled criminal defense
attorney who knows that an innocent man has been convicted of murder and executed. Id. The
attorney did nothing to prevent the execution because her knowledge is based on a previous
client's confidential admission, although the previous client has subsequently died. Id.
134. Id. at 741-43.
135. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2088-91 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (reversing conviction and remanding for new trial) [herein-
after Macumber I]; State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978) (affirming conviction after
second trial) [hereinafter Macuber I1].
137. Macumber II, 582 P.2d at 164. The bodies of an engaged couple were found lying next to
their car in May of 1962. Id. The police recovered from the crime scene "four expended .45-
caliber shell casings and one live .45-caliber round," as well as fingerprints from the car. Id. For
the next twelve years, until Macumber's name surfaced, the police had no leads. Id.
138. Id. at 164.
139. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1085. Macumber "was sentenced to serve two concurrent terms
of life imprisonment." Id.
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torneys who were prepared to testify that some years earlier, one Ernest
Valenzuela, now dead, had admitted to committing the dual murders
that Macumber was now accused of committing."4 The trial judge raised
Valenzuela's attorney-client privilege sua sponte"' and refused to allow
the two attorneys to testify.'42 The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the
trial court's decision to exclude the attorneys' testimony on the basis of
the attorney-client privilege.'43 The court's succinct rationale was that
the scope of Arizona's attorney-client privilege was provided in a state
statute, which did not provide an exception to the general rule that the
privilege does not end at the client's death."
140. Id. at 1086-87; Macumber II, 582 P.2d at 166. Both attorneys had represented Valen-
zuela in an unrelated 1968 murder charge. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1087. When the two attor-
neys learned that Macumber had been accused of the dual murder that Valenzuela had claimed
to have committed, the attorneys asked the Arizona Bar's Committee on Ethics for advice. Id.
The ethics committee advised the attorneys to disclose their information to the prosecution and
to the defense in Macumber's trial. Id. However, the trial judge did not share the ethics com-
mittee's opinion that the attorney-client privilege did not prevent the disclosure of this evidence
to the jury. Id.
141. Sua sponte means "of [the court's] own will or motion; voluntarily; without prompting
or suggestion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1424 (6th ed. 1990).
142. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1086.
143. Id. Macumber did win a new trial, however, because the trial judge erroneously ex-
cluded testimony from an expert who was prepared to testify that the .45-caliber shell casings
found at the scene could have been fired from weapons other than Macumber's .45-caliber pis-
tol. Id. at 1085-87. Macumber's defense the second time around centered on an alleged con-
spiracy by his estranged wife and the police to tamper with evidence and commit perjury in order
to see Macumber convicted. Macumber II, 582 P.2d at 164-65, 168-69. At the second trial, the
judge permitted a full hearing about the proposed testimony of the two attorneys and two psy-
chiatrists regarding Valenzuela's admissions. Id. at 166-67. The trial judge found that, in addi-
tion to the privilege problems, the proposed testimony lacked "sufficient circumstantial prob-
ability of trustworthiness ... to justify ... admission into evidence." Id. at 167. The Arizona
Supreme Court upheld that ruling and affirmed Macumber's second conviction for the double
murder. Id. at 170. Macumber continues to serve his life sentence in an Arizona prison, where
he has self-published a book on Arizona history. See Clint Williams, One Exclusive Boutique Shop
Sells Inmates' Crafts, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Nov. 19,1995, at BI.
144. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1086. The court presumed that the state legislature had
weighed the possibility that the attorney-client privilege might hamper justice before enacting
the statute. Id.
[tablln a concurring opinion, Justice Holohan argued for admission of the attorneys' testimony
as reliable hearsay declarations against penal interest. Id. at 1087-88 (Holohan, J., concurring).
Hearsay is "testimony in court of a statement made out of court, the statement being offered as
an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and thus resting for its value upon the
credibility of the out-of-court asserter." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 722 (6th ed. 1990). "The
very nature of the evidence shows its weakness, and, as such, hearsay evidence is generally in-
admissible unless it falls within one of the many exceptions which provides for admissibility." Id.
A declaration against penal interest is "[a]n out of court statement by a declarant who is un-
available as a witness [and] is admissible as an exception to the rule against hearsay if the state-
ment was against [the declarant's] interest at the time it was made." Id.
Justice Holohan argued that, under Chambers v. Mississippi, a criminal defendant's con-
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The Macumber case is one of the few appellate court decisions prior
to Swidler & Berlin that concerned the posthumous application of attor-
ney-client privilege in the criminal arena. 45 Another such criminal case,
the facts of which parallel those of Swidler & Berlin, is the 1990 Massa-
chusetts case of John Doe Grand Jury Investigation."46 In this case, a state
prosecutor sought the testimony of attorney John Dawley before a grand
jury regarding attorney Dawley's conference with a client. 47 The grand
jury was investigating attorney Dawley's client, Charles Stuart, and sev-
eral other people for the deaths of Carol DiMaiti Stuart and her son,
Christopher Stuart.' The day after his conference with attorney
Dawley, Charles Stuart jumped off the Tobin Bridge, killing himself.49
The trial court judge, purporting to act under Massachusetts state law,
reported the question to the court of appeals, and the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts then transferred the matter to itself.150
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted that the attorney-
client privilege often frustrates society's need for fill disclosure of all rele-
vant information but held that the benefit of the privilege to clients out-
weighs the burden to society.'' The court expressly held that the attor-
ney-client privilege survives the client's death and relied on the existence
of a testamentary exception as circumstantial evidence in support of this
conclusion.'52 The court reviewed and rejected the balancing test applied
stitutional right to due process is violated if a state's rules of evidence preclude the admission of
evidence that fits an exception to the hearsay rule, if that evidence is offered to exculpate the
defendant. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., concurring). See Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Because Valenzuela's admissions fit the declarations against penal
interest exception to the hearsay rule, Justice Holohan would have allowed the two attorneys to
testify at Macumber's trial. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., concurring).
145. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2085.
146. 562 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990).
147. John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69.
148. Id. See also Judy Rakowsky, Bennett's Relatives Settle Suit with City, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 31, 1995, at 23. Carol DiMaiti Stuart was Charles' wife and was pregnant with Christopher
when she was shot. Id. Charles Stuart claimed that a black man had shot him and his wife, and
the Boston police began investigating William Bennett as a suspect in the shootings. Id. The
activities of the Boston police during that investigation prompted subsequent civil rights litiga-
tion by the Bennett family. Id.
149. John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69; see also Rakowsky, supra note 148. Charles Stuart was aware
that his brother Matthew told the Boston police that Matthew disposed of the gun after Charles
shot and killed Carol. See John Ellement, Judge Returns Matthew Stuart to Prison, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, May 29, 1997, at B2. Realizing that he was now implicated in the crime, Charles killed
himself. Id. Within hours of Charles' suicide, CBS secured the rights to the Stuart murder story
and subsequently aired a TV movie in the fall of 1990, before the grand jury issued a final ver-
dict. See Joseph P. Kahn, Chuck Wagon, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1991, at 52.
150. John Doe, 562 N.E.2d at 69.




by the Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court in Cohen.' The John
Doe Court indicated that the only situation in which it could foresee
permitting a breach of the attorney-client privilege would be "where [the
breach is] mandated by constitutional considerations.'
' 54
The constitutional consideration raised by the John Doe Court is the
same concern raised by Justice O'Connor in the dissenting opinion of
Swidler & Berlin.'55 The issue is whether the mechanical application of
the evidentiary rule excluding privileged information violates a criminal
defendant's constitutional due process rights when the privileged infor-
mation is the only exculpating evidence available to the defendant and
the holder of the privilege is dead. However, the facts of Swidler & Berlin
(and the facts of John Doe) do not squarely raise that issue; there is an-
other line of cases available to a criminal defendant in such a predica-
ment.
In Chambers v. Mississippi,'56 the United States Supreme Court held
that the mechanical application of the evidentiary rule excluding hearsay
violates a criminal defendant's constitutional due process rights when the
hearsay bears "persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" and is the only
exculpating evidence available to the defendant.'57 When the only ex-
culpating evidence available to a criminal defendant is inadmissible as a
result of the posthumous application of the attorney-client privilege, the
defendant could argue for an expansion of Chambers into evidentiary
issues other than hearsay.158 Therefore, Justice O'Connor's very real con-
cern is addressed by a different line of cases, without disturbing the ap-
parently unbending rule as articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Swidler & Berlin did not squarely raise a Chambers issue because the
purpose of the evidence sought was not to exculpate a defendant in a
criminal trial. Rather, the OIC sought attorney Hamilton's notes for the
purpose of determining, through a grand jury, whether sufficient evi-
dence existed to pursue criminal actions against certain high-ranking
members of the executive department. 5' Factually, this raises an inter-
153. Id. at 71; see supra notes 121-32 and accompanying text.
154. Id. at 71-72.
155. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2089 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
156. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
157. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302.
158. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ariz. 1976) (Holohan, J., concurring). Justice
Holohan's concurring opinion discussed such a strategy and broadly stated the holding of Cham-
bets to be that "[a] state's rules of evidence cannot deny an accused's right to present a proper
defense." Macumber, 544 P.2d at 1088. See supra note 144.
159. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2083. As part of its overall investigation of possible
wrongdoing by President Clinton, the OIC also sought information from Deputy White House
Counsel Bruce Lindsay and from officers of the United States Secret Service. See Verbatim
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esting parallel between Swidler & Berlin and the 1974 case of United
States v. Nixon."6 Both cases involved independent prosecutors seeking
information concerning potential criminal activity at the highest levels of
the executive department. Both cases involved claims by the holders of
the information that its disclosure was barred by an evidentiary privilege.
Both cases arose in the early stages of a string of events that had the po-
tential to end in the impeachment of a president. 6 In Nixon, the Su-
preme Court recognized the importance of an executive privilege but
held that sometimes the judiciary's need to administer justice (especially
in the criminal arena) will trump the evidentiary privilege. 62 In Swidler &
Berlin, the Supreme Court was unwilling to similarly set aside the attor-
ney-client privilege. The two privileges differ in purpose and history; it is
not surprising that they differ in scope as well.
If anything is surprising about Swidler & Berlin, it is the rather broad
nature of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion, considering the narrow fac-
tual events giving rise to the legal issue. Perhaps it would have been more
appropriate for the Court to expressly limit its holding to situations in
which a grand jury is seeking relevant but allegedly privileged information
to determine whether a criminal prosecution should go forward and the
holder of the privilege is dead. In such cases, if an in camera review con-
Transcript of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's Prepared Testimony for Delivery Before the
House Judiciary Committee, 1998 WL 801023 (November 19, 1998) [hereinafter Starr's Testi-
mony]. The White House claimed that both of these matters involved privileged information,
and the OIC had to litigate the privilege issues in order to get the allegedly privileged informa-
tion before the federal grand jury. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. de-
nied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client privilege does not prevent a gov-
ernment attorney from testifying before a federal grand jury regarding the possible commission of
a federal crime); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461
(1998) (holding that no evidentiary privilege prevents members of the Secret Service from tes-
tifying before a federal grand jury regarding the possible commission of a federal crime).
160. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). President Richard Nixon attempted to quash a subpeona duces
tecum requiring the production of, among other things, tape recordings of meetings between
President Nixon and others for review by a grand jury. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687-88. For defini-
tions of subpeona duces tecum and grand jury, see supra note 8. President Nixon had not been
indicted by the grand jury, but he was named as an "unindicted coconspirator." Id. at 687.
President Nixon argued that an absolute executive privilege prevented disclosure of the tapes
and, alternatively, that a qualified executive privilege prevailed over the subpeona duces tecum.
Id. at 703. The Supreme Court held that the executive branch did not have an absolute privi-
lege to withhold relevant information, and that the general interest in confidentiality as ex-
pressed by President Nixon was insufficient to overcome "the demonstrated, specific need for
evidence in a pending criminal trial." Id. at 713.
161. See Juliet Eilperin & Peter Baker, GOP Proposes Wide-Ranging Clinton Inquiry; Plan Mod-
eled on Watergate Rules, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1998, at AOl. The OIC later announced that the
Travel Office investigation would not be relevant to the House of Representative's impeachment
inquiry of President Clinton. See Starr's Testimony, supra note 159.
162. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712-13.
Duquesne Law Review
firms that the information is part of a confidential disclosure made by a
client to an attorney while the attorney was providing legal counsel, the
client's privilege of nondisclosure survives the client's death. Such a rule
would clearly leave open the possibility of a different result when the in-
formation is sought during a criminal prosecution rather than during a
criminal investigation. 163
The holding of Swidler & Berlin appears to be much broader. The
majority is unwilling to overturn the prevailing common law rule that the
attorney-client privilege survives the client's death until the "light of rea-
son and experience" shows that such a breach will not thwart the historic
purposes of the privilege." Undoubtedly, the majority desired to articu-
late a bold, clear rule in order to promote certainty in a lawyer's explana-
tion of the attorney-client privilege to a client. This certainty allows both
attorneys and clients to confidently rely on the evidentiary attorney-
client privilege. The confidentiality that exists between an attorney and a
client dictates not just the attorney's relationship with the client, but also
that attorney's relationships with the court and with third parties.
6
Privileges are more than exclusionary rules of evidence, they are in es-
sence part of a person's property-like right to privacy. 166 It will be possible
for the Supreme Court to limit Swidler & Berlin to its facts in the future if
the Court finds it necessary to do so. In the meantime, attorneys have a
clear evidentiary rule in the federal realm that comports with every at-
torney's ethical duty to keep quiet about client confidences, even after
the client has died.
James F. Glunt
163. A footnote in the majority opinion clarifies that the facts of this case do not present
"exceptional circumstances implicating a criminal defendant's constitutional rights." Swidler &
Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087 n.3. This mere footnote has given hope to those who support a bal-
ancing test in privilege cases involving dead clients. See Steve France, "Weighty Reasons" for
Secrecy, 84 A.B.A. J. 44 (Aug. 1998) (quoting Professor Charles Wolfram, the chief reporter for
the American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, as suggesting that foot.
note 3 prevents Swidler & Berlin from being a "devastating blow to critics of an absolute privi-
lege").
164. Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2088.
165. See Hood, supra note 43, at 744 (explaining the importance of the attorney-client privi-
lege in the public's view of the legal profession).
166. See David W. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal
Court Today, 31 TUL .L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956) (arguing that "[pirimarily [privileges] are a
right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships,
from the state's coercive or supervisory powers and from the nuisance of its eavesdropping. Even
when thrown into the lap of litigation, they are not the property of the adversaries as such; even
in litigation, they may be exclusively the property of perfectly natural persons who wish to pre-
serve despite litigation, just as they preserved prior to litigation, their right to be left alone in
their confidences").
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